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Abstract
The European Union plans to include an energy efficiency binding target
in addition to the renewables and CO2 targets. In this paper, we develop a
requisite framework to study interactions arising from the combination of
instruments aiming at reducing emissions, promoting renewables and en-
ergy efficiency. The model allows the exact assessment of the instruments
interactions for quantities and prices. All instruments lead to emissions
reductions and the carbon price gives the right incentives for renewable
and energy efficiency. Contrary to these expected positive outcomes, we
find that the combination of more than two instruments creates significant
antagonisms regarding major policy objectives.
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1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) has developed a climate and energy strategy
with multiple objectives. Energy supply plays a central role in this strategy, not
only for energy security concerns but mainly because it represents the largest
opportunity for greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions mitigation. According to
UNFCCC data UNFCCC (2011), the combustion of fossil fuels makes up for
88 % of total EU GHG emissions.
The EU implemented in 2009 the Climate and Energy Package (CEP), aim-
ing at (i) cutting GHG emissions by 20 % compared to 1990 levels, (ii) producing
20 % of its energy from renewable sources by 2020 UE (2009a,b,c) and (iii) in-
creasing energy efficiency by 20%. This last objective is not binding. Therefore,
the EU plans to release a Directive on energy efficiency including binding mea-
sures for energy consumption reductions, among others UE (2011a,b). The CEP
strengthens the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), designed to share
emissions reduction efforts among member states. For renewable energy, objec-
tives are set at the state level, and most member states use a feed-in-tariff to
reach it. Energy efficiency legislation is sector-oriented, due to the scattered
nature of energy savings. Current legislation focuses on energy-intensive sectors
such as buildings, manufacturing, energy transformation and transport.
Given the high degree of interdependency between emissions, various energy
production sources and energy consumption reductions, interactions between
those policies are inevitably significant. A wide range of research papers has
investigated rationales, scope and conditions for efficient and effective policies to
reduce GHG emissions, apart or in combination. A number of effects have been
listed and characterized, but no formal definition of interactions has yet been
formulated and microeconomic analysis of interactions between the objectives
of the European Climate and Energy Package are still scarce.
This paper aims at helping bridging this gap. Its objective is to disentangle
the role interactions can play in the performance of a policy combination by
giving formal definition of interaction terms and quantifying them. We develop
therefore a simple model of supplies and demand in the energy sector including
the policy instruments of the CEP: a price on CO2 emissions, a renewable
energy subsidy and various demand reduction instruments. In various policy
combination scenarios we derive interaction terms between instruments.
Section 3 presents the model framework and analyzes interaction terms aris-
ing from the combination of several climate and energy policy instruments in
several policy mix scenarii. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the results and conclude.
2 Interactions and rationales for overlapping poli-
cies
The study of instrument combination is of particular interest in the energy
sector. Regardless of the reason invoked for their implementation, climate and
energy policy instruments affect energy-related goods that are highly substitu-
able, emphasizing the importance ofinteractions and indirect effects of specific
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policies. In a very general sense, interactions can affect expected outcomes at
any level: scope, objectives, implementation, operation or timing of a specific
policy (Sorrell, 2003).
While each of these aspects is worth investigating for further insight in policy
design, we will focus on a microeconomic perspective. This section discusses
some issues in the economic study of climate and energy policy interactions and
reviews some of the approaches adopted in the literature. For an exhaustive
review of interaction studies and a general framework to assess potential effects
of interaction between two instruments or two policy schemes, see for instance
Oikonomou and Jepma (2008).
2.1 Rationales for overlapping policies
According to basic economic theory, a single CO2 price across the whole
economy is the most efficient policy for mitigating emissions, because it allows
for a first best allocation of resources. However this first-best regime refers to
an ideal situation, because of several shortcomings in the emissions allowance
market. Market failures, technological failures and externalities prevent the
carbon market from reaching the right equilibrium. In the short term, the
absence of transmission of CO2 price effects to end-users, imperfect foresight
and bounded rationality can limit the efficiency and relevance of the emissions
market. In the mid-term, security of supply concerns, imperfect competition
and liquidity constraints can hinder the proper evolution of the permit price
trajectory. In the long term, innovation failures, market power and market
barriers limit the emergence of low carbon technologies.
Correcting each of these externalities or market failures is an objective as
such. The so-called Tinbergen rule (Tinbergen, 1952) states that policy-makers
should carry out an instrument for each one of its objective to avoid a trade-off
that would favor one objective over another. Besides parallel achievement of
different objectives, the joint implementation of policy instruments has been
justified on several grounds:
• Induced technical change may be higher for some options than for others,
justifying specific support (Philibert, 2011).
• The combination of inertia in technology deployment and imperfect fore-
sight can justify implementing more costly options before the full potential
for cheaper options is exhausted (Ha-Duong et al., 1997).
• Some market failures, regulatory failures or behavioural failures may re-
duce the economic efficiency of market-based instruments, justifying ad-
ditional instruments to tackle them (Gillingham et al., 2009).
Regarding the CEP, the overlapping of policy instruments is supported by
two alternative arguments. The first one places the climate mitigation objective
as the main driver of economic changes, and other instruments are aimed at
tackling the European ETS market failures. In this view, energy efficiency and
renewable energy policies reduce knowledge-based and technology-based fail-
ures of specific low-carbon technologies. In the second view, several objectives
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are considered simultaneously. Reaching 20 % of renewable energy production
and 20 % of energy consumption reductions are important as such because of
additional benefits they bring along (e.g. local employment or the alleviation
of energy security concerns). Yet, regardless of the adopted view, the interac-
tions between European climate and energy policies are inevitably significant,
given the high degree of interdependence between emissions, energy production
sources and energy consumption reductions.
2.2 Interactions resulting from policy overlapping
There are several approaches in the literature on climate an energy policy
interaction. Some authors classify interactions in different manners, mostly on
the basis of effect on expected outcomes, scope and governance (Sorrell, 2003,
Sorrell et al., 2003). Other analyze and sometimes quantify those effects, using
analytical or numerical models (Abrell and Weigt, 2010, Skytte, 2006, Sorrell
et al., 2009). A last category of papers uses a sectoral approach to highlight
interaction, mainly in the electricity generation sector (Fischer and Preonas,
2010, Traber and Kemfert, 2009).
As defined by Sorrell (2003), a relevant distinction between direct and indi-
rect interactions can be based upon the difference between affected and targeted
groups. Direct interactions occur when groups targeted by two policy instru-
ments overlap in some way. An indirect interaction takes place between two
policy instruments when a target group is indirectly affected by one of the in-
struments, as when a renewable obligation on electricity producers and a tax on
downstream electricity consumption both raise electricity price for end-users.
The INTERACT project report (Sorrell et al., 2003) makes further distinc-
tions between internal and external interactions, and between vertical and hor-
izontal interactions. Internal interactions refer to interactions between two or
more climate policy instruments whereas external interactions refer to interac-
tions between climate and non-climate policy instruments. Horizontal interac-
tions refer to the same level of governance (the European level for instance)
while vertical interactions refer to different levels. The report also defines trade
policy interactions as the influence of one policy instrument on another by the
exchange of an environmental trading commodity.
Analyzing mechanisms behind interactions, Skytte (2006) as well as Sor-
rell et al. (2009) develop graphical equilibrium analysis frameworks to separate
effects in each considered market (environmental commodity, electricity or en-
ergy efficiency goods) and to distinguish effects on demand curve from effects on
supply curve. They show in a graphical way that the promotion of one type of
energy displaces demand and supply curves for all types of commodities, having
an ambiguous effects on prices. Abrell and Weigt (2010) develop a static com-
putable general equilibrium model of Germany with differentiated renewable
technologies to test the effects of an emissions trading scheme and renewable
support mechanisms on each other. Their study shows that adding an instru-
ment promoting renewables to an ETS decreases environmental effectiveness by
letting the carbon price drop to zero in some cases. This addition also decreases
total welfare due to the additional financing needs of the renewable support
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scheme. This additional cost is highly sensitive on the learning rate assump-
tions for low carbon technologies. Numerical sectoral approaches, as developed
by Traber and Kemfert (2009) allow a more specific discussion on supply tech-
nologies and a quantification of synergies between instruments. They show two
frequently counteracting effects when combining an European ETS and national
renewable promotion schemes: a substitution effect and a permit price effect.
The latter occurs when substituting renewables to emitting fossil production.
Increased renewable production then reduces total emissions, thus reducing the
price of emissions permits and the end-user price. But promoting renewables
substitutes to fossil energy a more expensive energy, increasing therefore the
final price and leading to the substitution effect.
Fischer and Preonas (2010) develop a static partial equilibrium analytical
framework enabling to analyze variations in quantities and prices when various
policies are combined. Applying it to the American electricity production sector,
they discuss perverse effects of the addition of an emissions cap or a renewable
quota to a set of price-instruments (carbon tax, renewable subsidy or fossil fuel
tax). The first major result is that overlapping price-instruments with an emis-
sions cap can lead to the development of relative dirty technologies. When an
emissions cap is in place, instruments raising the emissions permit price discour-
age dirty technologies, whereas instruments that lower the emissions price allow
dirty technologies to displace cleaner ones4. In other terms, “when emissions
are capped, none of the overlapping policies can simultaneously disadvantage
both kinds of fossil generation” (Fischer and Preonas, 2010, p. 16). This merit-
order effect has been previously described by Böhringer and Rosendahl (2009).
The second major result is that when price instruments are combined to a re-
newable portfolio standard (RPS), any additional taxation of fossil energy will
lower generation from renewable sources because of the market share constraint
of the RPS.
2.3 Motivation and contributions
Most approaches tend to focus on graphical or qualitative approaches, or on
specific interactions between two instruments, often the EU-ETS and an instru-
ment promoting renewable energy. A comprehensive microeconomic approach of
interactions between three objectives and three instruments is still lacking. This
paper helps bridging the gap by analyzing interactions between all objectives
of the Climate and Energy Package. We complement the previous approaches,
more governance-oriented, by giving formal microeconomic definitions and an-
alytical demonstrations of interaction effects. While simple on purpose, as it
focuses on a deterministic, static partial equilibrium framework, we believe our
methodology is a valuable tool to compare and assess effects of multiple instru-
ments of the European climate and energy policy, in a context where binding
targets may be voted for energy consumption reductions.
4But this displacement is only a second order effect. It does not affect the global amount
of emissions.
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3 A minimal microeconomic framework to analyze
policy interactions
This section presents the simple model developed to analyze interactions be-
tween climate and energy policies. The first subsection introduces the general
framework and following subsections examine the different policy mix scenarii
considered. Table 1 describes all four scenarii and the policy instruments in-
cluded in each. Annex A lists all variables used in the model.
3.1 Model framework
Two fully substituable energies are combined to satisfy an exogenous demand
in energy (D): the energy from fossil fuels (f) and the energy from renewable
sources (r). This energy (in Joules or in MWh), is assumed to be consumed
through a non-specified energetic vector, for instance electricity, in order to
satisfy a service such as lighting, transportation or heating. The demand can be
reduced by an amount e through energy efficiency investments. This reduction
refers to the production of the same energy service with a different efficiency.
For instance, it can be the electricity savings following a switch to energy savings
bulbs or a switch to an A+ labeled appliance. These reductions do not refer
to sufficiency behaviors, where end-users adapt their consumption to price or
specific programs. For a detailed discussion on the differences between efficiency
and sufficiency, see Giraudet et al. (2011a,b). Sufficiency is represented by the
decreasing slope of the net demand function. It represents all energy savings
behavior components unrelated to technological improvement and which cannot
be easily subsidized. Gross demand D is defined by a function decreasing with
the wholesale price p (thus D′(p) ≤ 0). Demand is met according to following
equation:
f + r = D(p)− e (1)
The cost of producing energy from the two different sources (Cf and Cr) is
assumed to be in both cases growing and convex (C ′f (f) ≥ 0, C ′′f (f) > 0 and
C ′r(r) ≥ 0, C ′′r (r) > 0, where C ′i = ∂Ci(i)∂i and C ′′i (i) = ∂
2Ci(i)
(∂i)2 ). Decreasing
returns can be justified by the adopted static framework. With a given tech-
nology mix and production capacity, each energy producer uses first the most
efficient installations and moves gradually to costlier ones, according to merit
order. Energy savings are provided by investments in energy efficiency, assumed
to have also decreasing returns with respect to the energy savings, so for the
same reason C ′e(e) ≥ 0 and C ′′e (e) > 0.
We consider four policy mix scenarii (cf. Table 1), including an instru-
ment promoting energy efficiency, an instrument limiting GHG emissions and
a renewable energy subsidy (ρ) (for instance a feed-in tariff). Energy efficiency
promoting instruments include a subsidy (ε) and a quantitative energy efficiency
target (A) as in the French white certificate scheme, where participants must
provide a certain amount of certificate at the end of each period. The white
certificate are issued for each unit of energy saved compared to a baseline sce-
nario. The future European directive under discussion considers to force the
implementation of such a scheme in all member states. As further explained
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Scenario Policy instruments
T-S EE subsidy Carbon tax Renewable subsidy
T-Q EE quota
C-S EE subsidy Emission cap
C-Q EE quota
Table 1: Policy instruments included in the scenarii
in section 3.3, ε then becomes analogous to dual variable and can be used as a
proxy for the price of white certificates used on the energy efficiency market as-
sociated to the constraint. GHG limiting instruments include a carbon tax (φ)
and a cap-and-trade system . As we model a perfect market in a world without
uncertainty, this latter is equivalent to a tax equal to the price of emissions per-
mits. We therefore limit our study of scenarii including a cap-and-trade system
to the interactions between renewable energy and energy efficiency instruments
with the certificate price.
The two energies and the energy-efficient good to reduce demand are pro-
duced by representative producers, assumed to be price-takers and satisfying
the following symmetric profit-maximization programs:
max
f
pif = (p− φ) · f − Cf (f) for production from fossil source (2)
max
r
pir = (p+ ρ) · r − Cr(r) for production from renewable source (3)
max
e
pie = (p+ ε) · e− Ce(e) for energy savings from efficient goods (4)
with f, r, e ≥ 0 and p the wholesale price. In this setting, the price is the
wholesale market price. It comprises neither price instruments nor the public
cost of the policy. For simplicity, we consider energy efficiency as an energy
good. It means that we only consider the final savings of efficient goods and
tune the cost curve accordingly.
When replacing an old refrigerator for example, the choice is between tak-
ing an average-rated one or a more efficient one. The cost difference between
both can be here seen as an energy efficiency investment. This investment leads
to a saving corresponding to the consumption difference between both appli-
ances during a given time. Considering energy efficiency in this way allows the
development of a quasi-symmetric framework useful to apprehend interaction
effects. The cost function Ce(e) thus gives the portion of the total cost of a
given efficient good corresponding to the energy savings.
3.2 Scenario T-S: carbon tax and energy efficiency subsidy
We compute the total differentials of the market equilibrium equations de-
rived from the first-order conditions of the profit-maximization programs (2),
(3), (4) and the demand constraint (1). It results in following system allowing
us to study instantaneous and infinitesimal variations of wholesale price, energy
quantities and energy savings around the equilibrium:
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System 1 (Price and quantity differentials in scenario T-S).
dp = (df + dr + de) /D′(p) (5)
df = (dp− dφ) /C ′′f (f) (6)
dr = (dp+ dρ) /C ′′r (r) (7)
de = (dp+ dε) /C ′′e (e) (8)
Solving this system for df , dr, de and dp, gives following equations, describing
variations in wholesale price, energy quantities and energy savings as a function
of the various policy changes:
Result 1 (Differentials with respect to instrument levels in scenario T-S).
df =−dφ · (ηfηr + ηfηe + ηfηD)− dρ · ηfηr − dε · ηfηe
ηf + ηr + ηe + ηD
(9)
dr =dρ · (ηrηf + ηrηe + ηrηD) + dφ · ηrηf − dε · ηrηe
ηf + ηr + ηe + ηD
(10)
de =dε · (ηeηf + ηeηr + ηeηD) + dφ · ηeηf − dρ · ηeηr
ηf + ηr + ηe + ηD
(11)
dp =dφ · ηf − dρ · ηr − dε · ηe
ηf + ηr + ηe + ηD
(12)
where ηi( with i ∈ {f, r, e}) is defined as ηi = 1C′′
i
≥ 0 and corresponds to the
derivative of the inverse supply function with respect to price ηi = 1/C ′′i (q) =
(C ′−1i )′(p+ αi) for both energy types and the energy savings, with αi referring
to price instruments (αi ≤ 0 for taxes and αi ≥ 0 for subsidies). The inverse
supply function corresponds to the marginal cost curve if we consider a pure
competition framework with price-taking producers. ηD is defined as ηD =
−D′(q) ≥ 0 in order to have a positive variable and facilitate the comparison
with marginal cost curve derivatives.
In (9), (10), (11) and (12), the coefficient of policy variables dφ, dρ and dε
corresponds to the partial derivatives of respective quantity or price variables
with respect to corresponding policy variable. For instance, in (9), the coefficient
of dφ corresponds to the partial derivative of fossil production with respect to
carbon tax, ∂f∂φ =
−(ηfηr+ηfηe+ηfηD)
ηf+ηr+ηe+ηD . It corresponds to the variation of fossil
production when the carbon tax is changing.
In this example, the partial derivative is negative, meaning that increasing
the carbon tax reduces energy production from fossil fuel at equilibrium. This
is due to several effects. Increasing the tax increases the marginal cost of pro-
ducing energy from fossil fuel. This increase shifts the supply curve C ′−1f (p−φ)
downwards (because it is an increasing function), raising the price at equilib-
rium. This shift is characterized by expression −ηfηD in (9), corresponding to
the product of fossil energy supply curve and the opposite demand curve. An
increase in φ will also have an effect on ηf itself, indirectly changing the slope
of the supply curve. If C ′′f is increasing with respect to production, the partial
derivative of the fossil energy supply curve with respect to carbon tax is nega-
tive: ∂C
′−1
f
(p−φ)
∂φ =
−1
C′′
f
(C′−1
f
(p−φ)) ≤ 0. The decreasing slope of the supply curve
adds up to the downward shift.
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df dr de dp
dφ − + + +
dρ − + − −
dε − − + −
Table 2: Signs of the partial derivatives of both energy types (f, r), energy
savings (e) and market price (p) with respect to the policy instrument levels
(φ, ρ and ε) in scenario T-S.
An increase in φ also reduces the relative cost of renewable energy and energy
savings compared to energy from fossil fuel. The change in relative costs induces
a substitution between fossil energy and the two other energy options, renewable
energy and energy efficiency. This substitution is characterized by expressions
−ηfηr and −ηfηe in (9). The analogous expressions can be found in (10) and
(11). All above effects are tempered by the sum of all supply curves and the
demand curve. The substitutions and this tempering can be seen as a first effect
of instrument combination.
Table 2 summarizes the signs of the partial derivatives of both energy types
(f, r), energy savings (e) and market price (p) with respect to the policy instru-
ment levels (φ, ρ and ε). For instance, a − sign on the intersection of column df
and line dφ means that ∂f∂φ is negative, an increase in φ comes with a decrease
in f at equilibrium. The rate of variation of the market price is negative with
respect to subsidies ρ and ε because we do not consider the funding of those
policy instruments.
Equations (9), (10), (11) and (12) can also be interpreted as a whole, inter-
preting the effect on price or production of a combined change of two separate
instrument levels. A simultaneous increase of φ, ρ and ε will have negative
effects on fossil energy production that add up. Similarly, an increase in both
φ and ε will have two positive effects on energy savings that add up. By con-
trast, an increase in both ρ and ε will have an ambiguous effect on renewable
production, as the two effects have opposite signs. In this framework, we can
give following definitions:
Definition 1 (synergy). Two policy instruments are in synergy with respect
to a given variable (like production or price) when the partial derivative of this
variable with respect to the policy instruments have the same sign.
Definition 2 (antagonism). Two policy instruments are in synergy with respect
to a given variable (like production or price) when the partial derivative of this
variable with respect to the policy instruments have opposite sign.
Here, subsidies for renewable energy and energy savings are antagonistic
for renewable production and energy savings. A simultaneous increase in the
level of the subsidies will result in an ambiguous effect on renewable production
and on savings resulting from energy efficiency. Similarly, the carbon tax and
the subsidy for either renewable production or energy savings are in synergy
for respectively either renewable production and emissions reductions or energy
savings and emissions reductions. They are antagonistic for respectively either
9
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energy savings and emissions reductions or renewable production and emissions
reductions. Table 2 shows also that subsidies for renewable production and
energy savings are in synergy with respect to the wholesale price, as both tend
to reduce it, whereas there is an antagonism between those instruments and the
carbon tax with repsect to the wholesale price. This is due to the fact that for
simplicity we did not consider the impact of price instruments on the public
finances.
3.3 Scenario T-Q: carbon tax and energy efficiency target
In this scenario, the subsidy on energy efficiency is replaced by a quantitative
target. To represent an energy efficiency target, we assume that all accountable
reductions are made through energy efficiency investments. This is true for
instance for the French white certificate scheme, where certificate are issued
on the basis of standard procedures such as the replacement of an appliance.
Additional consumption reduction can be the result of sufficiency behaviors.
Those reductions are however difficult to account for. In the present setting,
they are captured by the decreasing slope of the demand curve, or a possible
shift to the left. Change in the energy price resulting from various policies can
also lead to a rebound effect. A demand reduction will induce a price drop that
itself lead to an demand increase.
For simplicity, we therefore display an energy efficiency target as a demand
reduction requirement e?, corresponding to a certain percentage of total con-
sumption. Global energy demand has to be lowered by a certain percentage
A compared to the business-as-usual scenario. We moreover assume that the
quota is binding. By doing so, we simply assume Ce is bigger than Cr and Cf :
other energy types are cheaper. This seems reasonable, otherwise promotion of
energy efficiency would be unnecessary.
In the equations, all goods are linked by the quota constraint : e = A D(p) =
A(f + r + e). Totally differentiating this constraint, system (1) becomes:
System 2 (Price and quantity differentials in scenario T-Q).
dp = (df + dr + de) /D′(p) (13)
df = (dp− dφ) /C ′′f (f) (14)
dr = (dp+ dρ) /C ′′r (r) (15)
de = A1−A (df + dr) +
dA
1−A (f + r + e) (16)
The system is resolved with following outcome:
Result 2 (Differentials with respect to instrument levels in scenario T-Q).
df = −dφ · (ηfηr + ηf (1−A)ηD)− dρ · ηfηr − dA · ηf ·D(p)
ηf + ηr + (1−A)ηD (17)
dr = −dρ · (ηrηf + ηr(1−A)ηD)− dφ · ηfηr − dA · ηr ·D(p)
ηf + ηr + (1−A)ηD (18)
de = dφ ·A ηfηD − dρ ·A ηrηD + dA ·D(p) · (ηf + ηr + ηD)(1−A)ηD + ηf + ηr (19)
10
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df dr de dp dε
dφ − + + + −
dρ − + − − +
dA − − + − +
Table 3: Signs of partial derivatives of variables (f, r, e, p) and certificate shadow
price (ε) with respect to instrument levels (φ, ρ and A) in scenario T-Q.
dp = dφ · ηf − dρ · ηr − dA ·D(p)
ηf + ηr + (1−A)ηD (20)
This result can be analyzed in the same way as the previous one. In (17),
(18), (19) and (20), the coefficients of dφ, dρ and dA correspond to the partial
derivatives of price and quantities with respect to the policy instrument. Com-
pared to scenario T-S, the addition of a consumption reduction quota simplifies
the system by removing some of the substitutions. This is due to the additional
constraint, linking the energy savings to total demand, and reducing the num-
ber of variables in the system. With this binding constraint, the variations of
e are due to the variation of the global energy demand, and can be seen as a
shift along the demand curve (expressions (A ηfηD) and (−A ηrηD) in (19)).
This effect is tempered by some substitutions between e and r, and between e
and f , at a level depending on the relative slopes of inverse demand functions.
Equations (17) and (18) thus display only one substitution term, similar to the
corresponding one in (19).
The addition of a consumption reduction quota affects the slope of the de-
mand curve. The quota permanently reduces the demand and ηD is replaced
by (1 − A)ηD. This change of the demand curve slope has an effect on energy
production when the quota A is moving. An increase in the quota level rises the
energy savings compared to renewable and fossil energy productions ( ∂f∂A ≤ 0
and ∂r∂A ≤ 0). The effect on the wholesale price follows this move of the de-
mand curve and decreases too, at a rate proportional to BAU demand (i.e. the
demand without the savings).
Table 3 summarizes the signs of rates of variations of both energy types
(f, r), energy savings (e), market price (p) and certificate shadow price (ε) with
respect to policy instrument levels (φ, ρ and A). The certificate shadow price
is defined in the next section. Results are comparable as those presented in
Table 2. The effects of a small change in the quota A have the same sign than
the effects of a change in energy savings subsidy in the previous section. The
magnitude of these effects changes however, depending this time on the absolute
level of demand. In addition to antagonisms and synergies highlighted in Table
2, we show here the counteracting effects of respectively renewable subsidy and
carbon tax or energy savings subsidy and carbon tax on the certificate price ε
(as described in section 3.4).
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3.4 Scenario T-Q: effects on the energy efficiency certificate
price (ε)
With a consumption reduction quota, ε becomes a shadow price, that is
an indication of the price of a white certificate if the consumption reduction
quota is backed by a certificate market. It can be seen as an addition to the
wholesale price for the energy savings, in order to help them become competitive
compared to energy production. Formally, it corresponds to the spread between
the wholesale price p and the marginal cost of energy savings C ′e. Replacing
de, df, dr in the quota constraint (16) and solving for dε gives:
Result 3 (Certificate price differential in scenario T-Q).
dε =dρ · (ηr(ηe +AηD))− dφ · (ηf (ηe +AηD)) + dA ·D(p) (ηe + ηf + ηr + ηD)
ηfηe + ηrηe + (1−A)ηeηD
(21)
Changes in the carbon tax or the renewable subsidy will cause some substi-
tutions between fossil and renewable energy, and move the equilibrium price.
An increase in renewable subsidy dρ will raise the certificate price, by increasing
the spread between wholesale price and marginal cost of energy savings. On the
contrary, the carbon tax, by raising the wholesale price p decreases this spread
and causes the certificate price to fall.
A change in the quota level dA first moves the demand curve, causing the
wholesale price to drop, and consequently the certificate price to raise. Second,
it causes the relative share of the energy savings to raise compared to renewable
and fossil energy, leading to an increase of the marginal cost of energy savings,
and thus an increase in ε. It is noteworthy that when an energy efficiency quota
is in place, the energy savings cost curve has no impact on the equilibrium any
more.
3.5 Scenarii C-S and C-Q: addition of energy efficiency instru-
ments to a CO2 cap
This framework also allows to analyze impacts of instrument combination on
the ETS permit price. In order to do so, we assume the cap is binding, and thus
emissions and fossil production are fixed: df = 0. In this setting, φ becomes
the shadow price of the emissions constraint, equal to the absolute value of the
spread between market price and the marginal cost of producing energy from a
fossil fuel. φ can be interpreted as a proxy of the ETS permit price. The effect
of changes in renewables and energy efficiency instruments on the permit price
is summarized in Table 4.
3.5.1 Scenario C-S: CO2 cap and EE subsidy
By substituting df from (9) and resolving for dφ, we obtain:
Result 4 (emissions permit price differential in scenario C-S).
dφ = −dρ ηr
ηr + ηe + ηD
− dε ηe
ηr + ηe + ηD
(22)
12
O. Lecuyer and R. Bibas Working Paper
dρ dε dA
dφ − − −
Table 4: Signs of rate of variations of CO2 permit price (φ) with respect to
policy instrument levels (ε, ρ and A) in scenarii C-S and C-Q.
We see that an increase in either the renewable or the energy savings sub-
sidy has a negative impact on the emissions permit price, weighted by a ratio
denoting the substitution between fossil energy and alternatives to fossil energy
when they are subsidized. When for instance renewable energy is subsidized, it
increases its market share compared to fossil energy. This reduces the burden
on fossil energy producers, it is less costly to comply with the emissions quota
and the permit price drops.
This result illustrates the recent debate about the necessity to “set aside”
some of the emissions permits in parallel of implementing energy-efficiency mea-
sures, in order to prevent the carbon price to collapse. An increased objective on
renewable energy production or energy savings would put a downward pressure
on carbon price, weakening the price signal given to the whole economy.
3.5.2 Scenario C-Q: CO2 cap and EE quota
With an energy savings quota, dφ can be derived from (17), giving following
equation:
Result 5 (emissions permit price differential in scenario C-Q).
dφ = −dρ ηr
ηr + (1−A)ηD − dA
D(p)
ηr + (1−A)ηD (23)
The results are comparable to the situation with only price instruments.
An increase in the energy savings quota will have a negative influence on the
emissions permit price. This time only, the magnitude of the influence is propor-
tional to total demand and not the slope of the curve, resulting in a potentially
larger effect on permit price.
4 Summary of results and discussion
Regarding the primary objective of the European climate and energy strat-
egy, namely the reduction of GHG emissions, the model shows that all the instru-
ments considered unequivocally reduce fossil energy consumption and therefore
associated GHG emissions (see Tables 2 and 3). The impact of the different
instruments on the wholesale price is however variable. If the impact on public
finance is overlooked and no charge is put on end-users, a carbon tax will raise
the price with the emissions reductions whereas renewable and energy savings
subsidies lower it.
The interaction between emissions permit price and subsidies for renewable
energy production or energy savings is shown to be negative. At equilibrium, the
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two subsidies reduce the emissions permit price. If the existence of a significant
emissions price is considered an objective in itself, this could lead to a serious
loss of global efficiency for the policy package on the long term. The perspective
of a strengthening of the renewable production objective or the energy efficiency
target has already had a negative impact on the forward ETS price. As widely
discussed in the press and the economic literature, a set-aside of some of the
emissions permits would be a way to keep the market under pressure and would
help reduce regulatory uncertainty about future levels of CO2 price.
Regarding all objectives of the Climate and Energy Package, the model
shows that a carbon tax promotes at the same time the reduction of fossil
energy consumption, the development of renewable energy and consumption
reductions through energy efficiency investments. In the presence of substan-
tial objectives for renewables and energy savings, this instrument may however
not be sufficient. It only ensures renewable energy and consumption reductions
evolve in the right direction, not that they will reach a specified target. Instru-
ments specifically promoting renewables and energy efficiency have to be added
to the system to ensure renewable production is above and energy consumption
below targeted levels. When they are implemented together, the two subsidies
have however opposite effects on productions and tend to reduce the absolute
level of each other.
We give a formal definition of synergistic and antagonistic effects in the
model. Two policy instruments have antagonistic effects with respect to a given
variable (like production or price) when their partial derivative with respect to
this variable have opposite signs. Two policy instruments are in synergy when
those partial derivatives have the same sign. When they are implemented to-
gether, a carbon tax, a renewable subsidy and an energy savings subsidy have
antagonistic effects with respect to market price. The two subsidies are antago-
nists with respect to renewable production and energy savings. The promotion
of renewables comes at the expense of energy savings promotion and conversely.
According to the model, the addition of a consumption reduction quota
or a white certificate scheme has, as one could expect, positive effects on the
demand, by reducing the net demand curve and reducing its slope. By reducing
the net demand, the energy savings quota reduces the need for fossil energy
(and thus GHG emissions) and reduces the market price. Moeover an energy
efficiency quota reduces the slope of the net demand curve. But energy efficiency
investments are in competition with renewables and in the model, an increase
of the quota comes with a decrease in renewable production at equilibrium.
Furthermore, an increase of the consumption reduction quota is followed by
a decrease in carbon price. This decrease is proportional to total demand,
resulting in a potentially large effect on permit price.
Since the model is static, it overlooks important dynamic effects such as in-
ertia or technical change. Yet, in the energy sector, a static analysis makes sense
for several reasons. First, the capital-intensive nature of the energy sector, cou-
pled with the imperfections in investors’ expectations stresses the importance
of short-term signals for investment decisions. Regulatory uncertainty is per-
ceived as a major risk for investors, thus un- derstanding interaction between
those signals at the investors’ time scale is crucial. Moreover, long-term signals
emerge from the interactions of short-term effects, and most analysis dealing
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with optimal mix of energy sources implicitly assume that short-term marginal
costs equal long-term maginal costs.
Another major assumption of the model is the perfect subsituability be-
tween renewable energy and energy efficiency. This is true with regards to some
objectives, such as meeting the energy demand , the reduction of fossil fuel
consumption or the reduction of GHG emissions. Being in the top-priority list
of the EU strategy, linking those policies and the targets associated stands to
reason. To be fully effective, policies such as the improvement of energy security
or the fight against climate change should consider all antagonistic effects of a
simultaneous promotion of energy efficiency and renewable energy or develop a
single instrument to reach its objective with less risks and less uncertainty.
However, in many other aspects, renewable energy and energy efficiency are
rather complementary. Renewables are supply-side oriented whereas energy ef-
ficiency has a huge potential on the end-user side. Energy savings often min- gle
technology-based energy efficiency improvements with behavioral-based energy
sufficiency improvements. While both tend to save energy, their promotion is
obviously very differ- ent in nature, involving information campaigns and indi-
rect incentives in the latter case. The promotion of technology- based energy
efficiency can also take many forms, ranging from R&D subsidies to training
programs for building sector workers or cross-incentive reductions.
5 Conclusion
In order to analyze interaction effects between instruments of the European
Climate and Energy Package, we develop in this paper a stylized analytical
framework of the energy sector. This framework allows to compare and quan-
tify interactions of various nature on prices and quantities. We use it to give
a formal definition of synergistic and antagonist interaction effects. We dis-
cuss the potential effects of future mandatory instruments of the draft Energy
Efficiency Directive. We show that regarding the objective of GHG emissions
reductions all instruments are effective, but that major antagonisms arise when
several objectives are considered concerning wholesale power price and emis-
sions allowance price as well as renewable energy production and energy savings
levels.
In a very broad sense, one instrument allows to control the absolute pro-
duction of one energy type, but it only ensures that alternative energy types
evolve in the right direction. Additional instruments are needed to control the
absolute production from several energy sources at the same time, but at the
expense of possible antagonisms between instruments. With three constraints,
as considered in this model, it is possible to control the absolute production from
three energy sources. The absolute level of price can be controlled, but at the
expense of loosing the control on the production level from one energy source.
In the existence of an objective on the energy price level (for distributional or
political purpose for example) or on the carbon price, an additional constraint
is necessary, but is likely to have a significant effect on welfare.
In our model, a single carbon price allows the reduction of fossil fuels. Addi-
tional measures are necessary to ensure renewable energy and energy consump-
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tion reductions are above targeted levels. Those additional measures reduce the
efficiency of any instrument taken independently. Setting a price on renewable
energy or energy efficiency promotion reduces the carbon price, and thus the in-
centive of carbon-free economy-wide investments (other than those promoted by
the policies considered). The joint promotion of renewable energy and energy
efficiency has antagonist effects by substituting renewables to energy savings
and conversely. This corroborates current concerns about a future carbon price
drop following the tightening of renewable or energy efficiency development ob-
jectives.
We also model the introduction of a quantitative binding consumption re-
duction target. We show that by reducing the net demand, the energy efficiency
quota reduces GHG emissions and reduces the market price. This leads however
again to antagonistic effects with instruments promoting renewables. Despite
having several positive effects on its own (like lower dependency on energy im-
ports, lower future capital-intensive investment needs and additional positive
externalities such as local employment), a demand reduction instrument may
not be compatible with other instruments in the Climate and Energy Package.
The existence of these interactions suggests the need for an integrated ap-
proach of climate and energy policy definition. The objectives have to be tuned
together, and instrument levels have to be defined taking into account all other
instruments. Put in other words, when adding a binding instrument to the
existing climate and energy instrument pool, those existing instruments should
be assessed and reviewed accordingly. If considered important, the price re-
duction objective, a European priority not so long ago (along with the energy
markets liberalization), should also be integrated into the policy design process
and should be adressed with a specific instrument.
Bearing in mind that the devils is in the details and that a detailed assess-
ment of specific instruments have to be done, one should consider our methodol-
ogy for assessing climate and energy policy packages at a macroeconomic level.
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A List of variables
List of variables
f Fossil energy
r Renewable energy
e Energy savings
p Wholesale price
D Energy demand
Ci Cost curve for energetic good i
C ′i Marginal cost curve for good i
C ′′i Marginal cost curve variation for i
ηi Slope of the supply curve of good i
ηD Opposite of the demand curve slope
φ Carbon tax
ρ Renewable energy subsidy
 Energy savings subsidy
A Consumption reduction quota
dα Small variations of variable α
18
